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Abstract
This paper examines the causal relationship between foreign mergers and acquisitions
and rm productivity in the UK over the period 1999-2007. Our results raise questions
about the existence of aggregate eects of foreign ownership on TFP in the longer-run.
However, we nd signicant heterogeneity in the TFP eects of foreign M&A at the indus-
try level. Overall, we uncover a systematic pattern of post-acquisition TFP eects that is
consistent with the most recent theoretical models of rm heterogeneity and cross-border
mergers and acquisitions as mode of foreign entry. Furthermore, we nd positive aggre-
gate eects on labor productivity due to capital deepening but not due to changes in TFP.
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11 Introduction
Over the past decade there has been a surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in
both manufacturing and services. Economists and policy makers tend to assume that foreign-
owned rms have an advantage over domestic rms due to large endowments of intangible
assets which compensate for a lack of local information and experience. There is indeed a
large empirical evidence showing that foreign-owned rms are more productive than domestic
rms (Doms and Jensen, 1998 for the US; Drield, 1997; Girma and G org, 2007; Grith
and Simpson, 2001; for the UK; De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2002, in the case of Belgium;
Pfaermayer and Bellak, 2002, in the case of Austria; Ruane and Ugur (2004), for Ireland).
More recent studies have shown that a large part of this productivity dierential is between
multinational rms and non-multinationals (Grith, 1999; Oulton, 2000; Temouri, Drield
and Higon, 2008). Hence, separating the eects of foreign ownership from other rm-specic
factors appears to be dicult. Moreover, most of these studies do not distinguish between
foreign greeneld investment and mergers and acquisitions.
Foreign M&A implying a change from domestic to foreign owners provide an appropriate
framework to isolate eects of foreign ownership. However, existing empirical evidence on the
causal link between foreign M&A and rm productivity is inconclusive. To the extent that
foreign investors acquire the best performing rms, the productivity advantage might not be
associated with foreign ownership per se. Harris and Robinson (2003) provide empirical evidence
showing that foreign investors tend to acquire rms with higher productivity in comparison with
other manufacturing rms in the UK. Furthermore, the higher productivity of foreign-owned
multinationals observed at the economy-wide level might simply reect the fact that they are
concentrated in high productivity sectors (Grith et al., 2004).
While a number of studies have found positive eects of foreign M&A on rm productivity
(Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1987 for the US; Conyon et al, 2002 for the UK; Arnold and Javorcik,
2005, for Indonesia; Bertrand and Zitouna, 2008, in the case of France) other research has found
that acquired rms do not reap any benet from foreign ownership (Harris and Robinson, 2003,
for the UK), has rejected a causal link (Barba Navaretti et al, 2004) or has found a positive
2eect only in the case of US multinationals (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002). Girma and G org
(2002) examine the eect in two specic industries in the UK. They nd that foreign acquisitions
had positive eects on rm productivity in the food sector but negative in electronics.
This paper examines the causal relationship between foreign mergers and acquisitions and
rm productivity in the United Kingdom (UK) in the short and the longer run. Since the
existing empirical evidence is inconclusive, we also address the following additional research
questions to shed more light on the source of the ambiguity in the results: what is the prole
of rms which are acquired by or merged with foreign-owned rms? To what extent do the
eects on rm productivity vary by the country of origin of the acquiring/merging rm? How
do the eects vary at industry level? Do the answers depend on the particular measure of rm
productivity?
We focus on the UK where the number of M&A deals has been especially large. Over
the period 1999-2007 we identify over 10,000 mergers and acquisitions in the UK of which
foreign takeovers account for a quarter of all deals. Grith et al. (2004) show that foreign
takeovers of non-multinational domestic-owned rms exceed foreign greeneld investments as
the most frequent mode of entry by foreign rms in the UK over the period 1999-2001 in both
manufacturing and services.
The question of whether foreign acquisitions lead to higher productivity is interesting and
relevant for both research and policy. To the extent that foreign investment is perceived as a
source of knowledge spillovers and productivity growth in the host economies, governments in
some countries (including the UK) have designed and implemented policies aiming at attracting
foreign investment. On the other hand, some governments (e.g. in France and Italy) have tended
to discourage foreign take-overs and instead encouraged the emergence of 'national champions'.
Measuring the eect of foreign acquisition on rm productivity raises two major economet-
ric issues. First, foreign investors may acquire better performing rms (selection bias). To
address this selection bias we analyze the causal eect of foreign acquisition on UK rm pro-
ductivity by using propensity score matching following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) combined
with dierence-in-dierence estimators (Heckman et al. 1997). Second, the derivation of rm
productivity (total factor productivity) involves several measurement issues. Therefore, we de-
3termine total factor productivity (TFP) by means of production function estimations at the
three-digit industry level. We follow the approach of Olley and Pakes (1996) which generates
unbiased industry level input elasticities by controlling for the correlation between unobserved
productivity shocks and rm inputs. In addition, we use three alternative rm productivity
measures as a robustness check: and a multilateral TFP index based on Caves et al. (1982),
TFP based on conventional OLS production function estimations, and labor productivity.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, in comparison with existing studies,
we use a richer micro data set which eectively covers all rms in the UK including over 2,000
foreign M&A over the period 1999-2007. Second, we use improved econometric techniques
to account for selection biases and derive several alternative rm productivity measures to
check for the robustness of our main result. Third, we explore the theoretical suggestion of
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) that attributes the heterogenous eects of foreign acquisitions on rm
productivity to industry-specic characteristics of the acquiring rm.
Our results lead us to question the existence of longer-run eects of foreign ownership on
rm TFP in the UK at the aggregate level. However, we do nd signicant heterogeneity in
the eect of foreign M&A on target rm productivity at the industry level. This heterogeneity
across industries potentially explains the absence of positive TFP eects at the aggregate
level. Moreover, following Nocke and Yeaple (2007) we classify acquiring rms as R&D- and
marketing-intensive. Overall, we uncover a systematic pattern of post-acquisition TFP eects
that is consistent with the most recent theoretical models of rm heterogeneity and cross-border
mergers and acquisitions as mode of foreign entry. Finally, at the aggregate level we nd that
foreign acquisitions had positive eects on labor productivity due to capital deepening. This
points to the potentially misleading results from using labor productivity instead of TFP to
measure the causal impact of foreign M&A through technology or organizational spillovers on
target rm performance in the UK.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical
literature. The next section discusses the empirical methodology we use to explore the causal
relationship between foreign acquisitions and rm productivity. Section 4 species the data
and our dierent approaches to measure rm productivity. Section 5 discusses our empirical
4results. Finally Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
The early theoretical literature on foreign direct investment known as the Ownership-Location-
Internalization (OLI) framework (Vernon, 1966; Caves, 1974; Dunning, 1977) has focused on
three characteristics of multinational rms that are likely to explain their better performance
in comparison to domestic-owned rms. These characteristics are: (i) large endowments of
intangible assets that compensate for the lack of local knowledge (of markets, consumer pref-
erences and business practices), hence allowing successful competition with domestic rms; (ii)
location advantages that arise from being located in a foreign country rather than exporting to
it; and (iii) advantages from internalizing technology rather than licensing it to foreign produc-
ers. These elements have been formalized in seminal papers by Markusen (1984, 1995, 2002),
Helpman (1984, 1985), and Markusen and Venables (1997, 1998). More recently, Helpman et
al. (2004) show that in the presence of xed costs to exporting and to undertaking foreign
direct investment, in equilibrium, heterogeneous rms can be ordered in terms of productivity,
as follows: the least productive exit, the more productive rms serve only the domestic market,
the next more productive serve the domestic market and export, and the most productive rms
serve the domestic market and undertake foreign direct investment. Accordingly, it follows that
in their country of origin multinationals are the most productive rms.
This literature explores the eect of foreign ownership on rm productivity not distinguish-
ing formally whether it refers to greeneld investment or foreign M&A. However, the paper by
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) focuses explicitly on the relationship between cross-border M&A as
a mode of entry into foreign markets and eciency of rms. The authors show that either the
most or the least productive rms acquire foreign targets. In particular, their model predicts
that foreign acquirers operating in R&D-intensive industries represent the most productive
rms in the corresponding industries in their home country while foreign acquirers operating in
marketing-intensive industries represent the least productive rms.1 The predictions of Nocke
1The authors consider R&D and advertising as relatively internationally mobile and immobile factors, re-
5and Yeaple (2007) contrast with the predictions of the earlier studies which did not distinguish
between foreign M&A and greeneld investment. That is, instead of a linear productivity or-
dering, Nocke and Yeaple (2007) predict that both the most and the least productive rms
will acquire foreign targets. Their nding limits the scope for positive aggregate eects of for-
eign acquisition on rm productivity and instead highlights the importance of industry-specic
eects.
While the heterogenous trade and investment literature suggests that at least some multi-
national rms are more productive than domestic-owned rms, it does not imply that foreign
ownership per se leads to higher productivity. Foreign multinationals may also aect the mar-
ket structure and the degree of competition in the host economy. The industrial organization
(I-O) literature oers further complex insights on the eects of M&A on rm productivity in
the longer-run. On the one hand, incentives to concentrate market power involve a decline in
competition which potentially entails lower long-run productivity growth in that industry. On
the other hand, eciency gains due to the diusion of technological or organizational knowl-
edge, economies of scale, or the reduction of managerial slack result in long-run productivity
gains. In the short-run, however, the impact of a take-over on rm productivity is expected to
be negative due to the high short-run costs of reorganization. The latter eect is expected to
be larger after cross-border deals due to higher adaptation costs. Similarly, long-run produc-
tivity eects after foreign M&A are potentially more pronounced due to the larger scope for
knowledge spillovers and adverse competition eects.
3 Empirical strategy
The key empirical objective of this paper is to evaluate the causal eect of foreign acquisition
on rm productivity. The main challenge is that we do not observe the productivity of acquired
rms had they not been acquired. We address this missing data problem by using propensity
score matching (PSM) following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The central idea is to compare
the productivity of foreign-acquired rms with the rm performance of a control group that
spectively.
6includes non-acquired rms with similar observable characteristics. While matching methods
account for the bias due to observable rm characteristics, selection bias might also stem from
time-invariant unobserved rm characteristics. To eliminate this latter bias, we combine the
propensity score matching with the dierence-in-dierence estimator suggested by Heckman et
al. (1997).
In the rst stage, the propensity-score matching estimator summarizes the vector of pre-
treatment characteristics, X, into a single-index variable, the propensity score p(X). The
propensity score measures the conditional probability of a rm to be acquired by a foreign
owner given data on rm characteristics and past rm performance.2
In the second stage, we estimate the average eect of foreign acquisition on target rm
productivity in the post-acquisition period. To do this, we use the productivity of the non-
acquired domestic rms with a similar propensity score to generate counterfactual observations.
To control for the possible bias that is due to selection on unobservables, we compute the
eect using the dierence-in-dierence matching estimator (Heckman et al, 1997). Hence, we
compare the evolution of productivity of foreign-acquired rms and domestic rms that exhibit
an equivalent ex ante probability of being taken over given rm characteristics, performance
indicators, and time-invariant unobservables. The average eect of acquisition on the acquired








where y is the dierence between the average productivity before and after the acquisition,
pi denotes the predicted probability of being acquired for rm i in the group of acquired rms
A, pc the predicted probability of being acquired for rm c in the control group C, and !(:) is
a function assigning the weights to the counterfactual rms c.3
2It is determined in a probit regression, i.e., the binary dependent variable denes the rm's acquisition
status in year t. It is equal to 1 in the year of a foreign takeover and 0 if the rm is domestically owned and
has not been acquired during the sample period.
3We use the propensity score matching procedure as described in Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
74 Data and methodology
4.1 Data
Our analysis is based on rm-level data from the UK over the period from 1999 until 2007.
We employ M&A data from the Bureau van Dijk's Zephyr database which has information on
over 2,000 foreign M&A of UK rms between 1999 and 2007. This information is combined
with the data from the Amadeus database which provides detailed balance sheet data for all
UK rms. The combination of both data sets allows us to compare the eects of cross-border
M&A on the performance of acquired rms in dierent industries and to distinguish short-run
from longer-run eects.
We model the probability (propensity score) of foreign acquisition as a function of the
following rm characteristics observed in the pre-acquisition period: the return on capital (rm
protability), the ratio of interest expenses to total assets (a proxy of perceived trustworthiness
by nancial institutions), a rm's age, size4, and characteristic variables to capture ownership
and solvency. Two dummy variables capture the ownership status of a rm: state is equal to
1 if its legal form is not private and 0 if it is, while quoted takes the value 1 if a rm is publicly
quoted and 0 if not. The rm's solvencu status dummy variable exit is equal to 1 if the rm
is insolvent and 0 otherwise. Finally, we account for year xed eects and for industry-specic
xed eects, distinguishing sectors by means of three-digit NACE codes in the propensity score
estimation.
The computation of TFP, which is described in the following section, requires information
on output, physical capital, labor, and the corresponding input elasticities. We measure output
as real5 value added. Capital and labor are measured as real xed tangible assets and the
number of employees, respectively. We also include gross investment, measured by the change
in the capital stock plus depreciation, which is included as an instrument for the unobservable
technology shock in the estimation procedure of Olley and Pakes (1996).
4We employ a rm's number of employees as a measure of its size.
5Real variables are obtained by using output price deators at the two-digit industry level and aggregate
input price deators both stemming from Eurostat.
84.2 Measuring productivity
The dierence-in-dierence matching estimator provides an appropriate framework to analyze
the causal eect of foreign M&A on UK rm productivity. However, it would produce mislead-
ing results if the underlying productivity measure does not allow for a meaningful cross-rm
comparison. Thus, the quality of the results hinges crucially on the construction of a detailed
and unbiased productivity measure. Therefore, and in contrast to most previous studies, we
use several dierent productivity measures to check for the robustness of our main results.6
Our main productivity measure is TFP since changes in TFP directly reect the eciency
gains following foreign acquisitions due to the diusion of technological or organizational knowl-
edge and economies of scale. We derive TFP of rm j in sector s at time t as a residual from





sljst + s + t + "jst (2)
where yjst denotes a rm's value added, kjst and ljst the physical capital and labor inputs,
s is a vector of industry specic eects, t a vector of year specic eects,  = (k;l) a vector
of average input elasticities, and "jsi an error term.
We estimate (2) to obtain empirical measures of the average input elasticities k
s and l
s
from rm level data. We account for heterogenous input elasticities across three-digit (NACE)
industry levels in that we estimate the marginal input eects separately for each of the three-
digit industries.7 The estimation of (2) involves a well-known endogeneity problem, viz, a
rm's demand for labor is expected to depend on its contemporaneous productivity level which
is captured in the error term. Appropriate instruments for labor services that are uncorrelated
with productivity are typically not available. However, Olley and Pakes (1996) develop a
semi-parametric estimator to extract consistent estimates of the input elasticities in production
function estimations. The method supposes that a rm's investment decision is a function of
6We illustrate below that the use of TFP instead of labor productivity is crucial identifying the eect of
foreign acquisitions on subsequent technological capabilities of UK target rms.
7We also employ three-digit output price deators to deate the output, capital, and investment series with
industry specic deators.
9its capital stock, age, and its unobserved productivity. Hence, the unobserved productivity
parameter can be modeled as some (inverse) function of investments, capital, and age given the
assumption of a monotonic relationship between investment and productivity. We apply this
methodology to derive consistent estimates of the average input elasticities in our sample. A
detailed description of the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure is given in Appendix A.1.
We derive three additional productivity measures to examine the robustness of our main
results. First, we follow Caves et al. (1982) to develop a relative TFP index using the industry-
level geometric average as a reference point. This methodology employs rm level factor shares,
instead of a production function estimation, to compute the corresponding input elasticities.8
Second, we estimate (2) using a conventional least squares estimator and compute the corre-
sponding TFP levels accordingly. Third, we use labor productivity, which is measured as a ratio
of a rm's value added to its number of employees, a measure often used in the existing liter-
ature (e.g. Conyon et al, 2002). Note, however, that labor productivity is a broader measure
than TFP since it reects the joint inuence of changes in TFP and the capital-labor ratio, i.e.
in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, we have: ln(Y=L) = ln(TFP)+ln(K=L).
4.3 Sample properties
Our sample comprises an unbalanced panel. Moreover, we do not observe the amount of value
added and xed tangible assets for all of the rms.9 This reduces the eective number of foreign
M&A that can be included in the propensity-score estimation. In the end, we are left with 606
foreign M&A with available data to compute a TFP measure for the UK foreign acquired rms.
The second stage of the dierence-in-dierence matching estimator, however, requires that a
rm's TFP measure is available for at least two consecutive years after a foreign takeover which
8In particular, the factor shares of labor and intermediate inputs are measured by the mean of rm- and
industry-level (three-digit) factor shares. The factor share of the capital stock is derived by assuming constant
returns to scale. The output and input measures are all computed relative to an industry-level median. Note
that this procedure implicitly assumes perfectly competitive factor markets and constant returns to scale.
9In addition, we restrict the sample to cover non-negative observations for value added, xed tangible assets,
and number of employees. Note that we do not impose further corrections for outliers among non-target domestic
rms since the matching estimator does not take observations into account which can not be matched properly.
10further reduces the eective number of matched foreign M&A to 392. Finally, since we do not
observe the debt-asset ratio and protability for all of these rms, the eective number of foreign
M&A in the dierence-in-dierence estimation is reduced to 318.10 Since the control group of
domestic rms that have not been the target of a (foreign or domestic) takeover numbers over
14,000 rms, it is possible to match target and control rms very closely.11
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the foreign-acquired rms and all other rms
for each of the variables. The average log TFP levels and labor productivity of foreign-acquired
rms are lower than the corresponding productivity indicators of all other rms. Moreover,
foreign-acquired rms have, on average, a higher return to capital, are smaller, younger, more
likely to be quoted or publicly-owned, and less likely to be insolvent. The higher average return
to capital, which measures a rm's protability, indicate that foreign acquirers \cherry pick"
on the basis of rm protability. The propensity score estimations, which are outlined in Ta-
ble 2 below, generally conrm this conjecture. The data also reveal considerable heterogeneity
among foreign-acquired rms, since the standard deviations among these rms generally exceed
the ones among all other rms. Table 1 also shows the descriptive statistics for the manufac-
turing and services sectors separately. Accordingly, the TFP measures based on Olley-Pakes
or OLS display higher levels for foreign-acquired rms in the manufacturing sector while all
four productivity proxies indicate a lower average level for foreign-acquired rms in the service
industries. In contrast, the returns to capital are higher for foreign-acquired rms in both
sectors.
The reduction in the eective number of foreign M&A in our sample due to the data
10Note that we obtain the same qualitative results if we base our eective sample on the 392 foreign M&A by
excluding the debt-asset ratio and our measure of protability from the propensity score estimation. However,
the balancing tests (see Section 4.5) indicates that both variables improve the test results in some specications.
11Moreover, 75% of the 318 foreign M&A represent vertical takeovers. We label a takeover \horizontal" if
(a subsidiary of) the acquirer operates in the same industry, dened by four-digit NACE codes, as the target
rm. Otherwise, the M&A is labeled \vertical". Note that vertical foreign investments are generally considered
to involve a larger scope for spillovers between foreign and domestic rms (e.g. Javorcik, 2004). However,
we do not nd signicant dierences between the eects of vertical and horizontal M&A (see Table A2 in the
Appendix).
11Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Target rms All other rms
rms mean sd rms mean sd
lntfp-op 318 0.70 0.52 14330 0.71 0.60
Y=L 400 256.81 931.71 12884 552.88 2375.10
lntfp-ols 318 0.76 0.53 14330 0.80 0.60
lntfp-Caves 316 -1.12 2.54 14330 -0.19 31.01
return-cap 318 31.40 93.33 14330 28.69 70.89
debt-asset 318 0.02 0.02 14330 0.02 0.02
size 318 1.22 5.66 14330 5.79 4.86
age 318 27.68 24.72 14330 28.74 21.78
state 318 0.14 0.35 14330 0.09 0.29
quoted 318 0.06 0.24 14330 0.03 0.17
exit 318 0.02 0.14 14330 0.03 0.17
Manufacturing (NACE 15-37):
lntfp-op 127 0.55 0.36 51382 0.51 0.43
Y=L 161 129.81 378.26 45523 346.69 979.32
lntfp-ols 127 0.58 0.32 51382 0.56 0.40
lntfp-Caves 126 -1.04 2.06 51382 -0.09 3.45
return-cap 127 26.55 90.05 51382 20.52 51.73
debt-asset 127 0.02 0.02 51382 0.02 0.02
size 127 0.95 4.01 51382 0.65 4.92
age 127 31.50 29.48 51382 34.61 25.19
state 127 0.08 0.27 51382 0.08 0.27
quoted 127 0.02 0.12 51382 0.04 0.19
exit 127 0.02 0.12 51382 0.03 0.17
Services (NACE 50-74):
lntfp-op 166 0.79 0.61 100600 0.83 0.64
Y=L 215 351.47 1194.75 92858 668.94 2779.61
lntfp-ols 166 0.86 0.62 100600 0.89 0.66
lntfp-Caves 165 -1.11 2.95 100600 -0.25 40.46
return-cap 166 33.45 101.71 100600 31.78 78.47
debt-asset 166 0.01 0.02 100600 0.02 0.02
size 166 1.34 6.64 100600 0.55 4.84
age 166 24.33 20.45 100600 25.94 19.90
state 166 0.18 0.39 100600 0.10 0.30
quoted 166 0.09 0.29 100600 0.03 0.16
exit 166 0.02 0.15 100600 0.03 0.18
12requirements of the estimation procedure raises the question of whether the remaining deals
are still representative of the underlying population of more than 2,000 cross-border deals from
1999-2007. Therefore, the last three columns of Table A3 in the Appendix explicitly report the
descriptive statistics for the foreign-acquired rms that can not be accounted for in the second
stage of the dierence-in-dierence matching estimation. It appears that the TFP levels based
on Olley-Pakes or OLS are very similar among the foreign-acquired rms that are included in the
sample and the ones that have to be excluded. Thus, the main outcome variable in our sample,
TFP based on Olley-Pakes, appears to be representative of the population of foreign-acquired
UK rms. However, labor productivity and TFP based on Caves et al. (1982) are relatively
higher among the latter group while the returns to capital and age are relatively lower.12 Table
A4 in the Appendix lists the total number of deals in the population and our eective sample
across two-digit NACE industries. The fth and the sixth columns display the shares of the
number of foreign deals in an industry relative to the total number of deals in the two groups,
respectively. The last columns indicate that the distribution of foreign M&A across industries
in the eective sample and in the total population is very similar. There are only some notable
dierences in the construction sector as well as two service industries: computer & related
activities and R&D & other business. Therefore, we calculate sample weights for the changes
in TFP in the second stage of the dierence-in-dierence matching estimator.13 Table A5 in
the Appendix and Table 4 report the results for the weighted and unweighted TFP estimations,
respectively; they reveal that the results in post-acquisition periods are qualitatively the same.
Finally, a Hausman test, which is given in the last column of Table A5 in the Appendix, does
not reject the exogeneity of our sampling procedure.
12The level of labor productivity in our eective sample relative to the population seems to be, if anything,
biased downwards. Still, we nd a signicant increase in labor productivity in post-acquisition periods (see
Section 5) which therefore seems to even understate the eect for the whole population.
13The weights are calculated for each three-digit industry sub-group by dividing the number of foreign M&A
in the population by the number of foreign M&A in the sample.
134.4 Propensity score estimation
The rst stage of the estimation strategy involves the estimation of the propensity scores. Ta-
ble 2 reports the results of the corresponding probit estimation. Note that all explanatory
variables are lagged by one year since we aim to account for pre-takeover rm characteristics.14
The rst column shows that there is a positive concave relationship between the size of a rm
and the probability of a foreign takeover. Moreover, the probability of a foreign takeover is
declining in the age of a rm and signicantly inuenced by industry- and year xed eects.
The coecients of TFP and protability are negative and positive, respectively, but not sig-
nicant at conventional levels. The next columns provide the results of the probit estimations
that correspond to our alternative estimation specications. They reveal the determinants of
domestic M&A, foreign takeovers by US and EU+ rms15, and M&A in the manufacturing and
service sector, respectively. The last two columns display the ndings for TFP based on Caves
et al. (1982) and labor productivity. Most importantly, our evidence suggests that domestic
takeovers tend to favor less productive rms. In addition, the results show that foreign rms
from other EU+ countries acquire, on average, more protable UK rms. This suggests that
\cherry-picking" for this type of M&A is based on protability instead of productivity which
is harder to observe.16
14The Zephyr database provides two dierent calendar dates for each takeover: the day when the deal has
been announced and the date when it has been completed. In the following, we use the date of completion to
identify the year of a takeover. We obtain, however, the same qualitative results if we alternatively use the year
of announcement. The corresponding results are available from the authors upon request.
15EU+ represents the following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.
16We do nd cherry picking based on TFP in the manufacturing sector if we exclude the protability measure
and include the ratio of R&D over assets as an additional determinant for foreign M&A. However, we only
observe R&D for 270 of the 318 deals in the eective sample. Therefore, we do not include this variable in the
propensity score estimation. These results are available from the authors upon request.
14Table 2: Propensity score estimation
for M&A dom M&A US M&A EU+ M&A man M&A ser M&A for M&A for M&A
lntfp-op -.0424 -.0624 -.0359 -.0734 -.0464 -.0688





return-cap .0003 .0001 .0003 .0005 .0006 .0002 .0002 -.0002
(1.41) (.43) (.99) (2.04) (1.14) (.87) (1.01) (-.92)
debt-asset .1569 -.2031 -1.24 .3038 2.50 -2.50 .1573 .5059
(.28) (-.35) (-.89) (.48) (3.59) (-1.86) (.28) (2.60)
size .0330 .0291 .0208 .0512 .0575 .0287 .0330 .0230
(3.55) (3.27) (2.18) (3.49) (2.76) (2.97) (3.55) (2.88)
size2 -.0004 -.0005 -.0002 -.0012 -.0011 -.0003 -.0004 -.0003
(-1.88) (-2.20) (-1.61) (-2.40) (-2.11) (-1.63) (-1.88) (1.87)
age -.0018 -.0021 -.0020 -.0019 -.0020 -.0012 -.0017 -.0019
(-1.96) (-2.79) (-1.39) (-1.65) (-1.62) (-.88) (-1.93) (-2.28)
state .0513 -.0944 -.1002 .2026 .0624 .0302 .0524 .0117
(.87) (-1.76) (-.95) (3.03) (.59) (.40) (.89) (.21)
quoted -.0329 -.1729 .3500 .0137 -.4844 .1252 -.0316 .0646
(-.32) (-1.61) (2.39) (.11) (-2.17) (.98) (-.30) (.73)
exit -.0106 .1907 .0216 -.0242 .3472 -.1523 -.0089 .0389
(-.12) (3.00) (.15) (-.19) (1.59) (-1.06) (-.10) (.47)
year-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
P-values of joint test:
year-FE = 0 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
industry-FE = 0 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Observation. 152608 161216 126912 128729 42678 92682 152608 138839
pseudo R2 .042 .044 .060 .051 .042 .045 .042 .045
ps-likelihood -3080 -4845 -1204 -1665 -1146 -1662 -3081 -3263
Sample covers all U.K. rms with information on value added, employment, and investments between
1999-2007. M&A is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 in the year of a (foreign) takeover and 0 if
the rm is domestic and has not been the target of a (domestic or foreign) takeover between 1999-2007.
Explanatory variables lagged by one year. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
154.5 Balancing test
The dierence-in-dierence matching method provides a robust method for estimating the for-
eign acquisition eect on rm productivity if, conditional on the propensity score, the potential
outcomes before and after acquisition are independent of the acquisition. Under the assumption
of independence conditional on observables, the pre-acquisition variables should be balanced be-
tween the acquired and matched groups. Lack of balance points to a possible mis-specication
of the propensity score estimation. We handle the balancing hypothesis in two ways: (i) we test
the signicance of dierences between acquired and matched rms for each variable entering
the propensity score estimation; (ii) we test whether those dierences can be taken as jointly
insignicant using a likelihood ratio test.
Table 3 summarizes the results for the balancing tests based on the dierent matching
estimates.17 The standardized dierences between the acquired and matched control rms are
smaller than 15% for foreign and domestic M&A.18 Moreover, the formal paired t-test between
acquired and matched control rms indicates that the balancing hypothesis can not be rejected
at conventional levels for most of the individual series. The balancing hypothesis is rejected
at the 5% for the age of a rm in the case of domestic M&A and for the debt-to-asset ratio
in the manufacturing sector, respectively. In addition, it is rejected for the dummy variables
\quoted" and \state" at the 5% level for US and EU+ M&A and in the service sector.
In addition to the t-test for the individual series, we use a likelihood-ratio test which tests
for the joint insignicance of the standardized dierences between the acquired and the matched
control rms. The corresponding p-values of the likelihood ratio test are presented in the fth
and ninth column in each of the corresponding tables that report the results of the dierence-
in-dierence matching estimator (Tables 4-8). Accordingly, the test results show that the
balancing conditions are satised for each dierence-in-dierence matching estimation in each
17Table 3 outlines the test results based on the matching estimator for year 0. The test results for all other
years can also not be rejected but are not reported here. The corresponding summaries are available from
authors upon request.
18Even though there is no formal criterion as to how large a standardized bias should be at most, we follow
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in assuming that a value of 20% is large.
16year.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Aggregate TFP eects
Table 4 reports the results of the dierence-in-dierence matching estimator. The rst column
shows the (cumulative) eect of foreign acquisition on rm productivity in the year of comple-
tion of a takeover (0) up to 5 years thereafter. We nd that foreign-acquired rms have, on
average, 5.1% lower TFP-growth in the takeover year than domestic rms that had a compara-
ble pre-takeover probability of becoming a foreign M&A target.19 The coecient is statistically
signicant at a 5% level. The estimation is based on 318 foreign takeovers between 1999 and
2007. The cumulative growth dierence is close to zero in the rst year, increases to 4% two
years afterwards, and levels o at about 2-3% in the third and fourth year after the takeover.20
However, the positive cumulative growth dierences in the rst four years after the M&A are
not statistically signicant at conventional levels.21
The negative initial impact of M&A suggests the presence of restructuring costs that reduce
the TFP-level in the year of completion of the M&A. In contrast, we do not nd evidence for
positive longer-run eects of foreign M&A on the productivity of acquired rms.
The limited evidence for positive productivity eects of foreign M&A in the rst ve years
after the takeover might be explained by heterogenous TFP performances among foreign ac-
quired rms. In particular, the existence or magnitude of productivity spillovers might depend
19We employ the Epanechikov kernel matching estimator. The results are, however, qualitatively equivalent
if we use a Gaussian kernel estimator or the nearest neighborhood matching estimator. The results of the
alternative estimations are available from the authors upon request.
20We use the n + 1's dierence in log TFP-levels to compute the growth rate n years after the takeover. For
example, if a foreign M&A takes place in t TFP-growth in the fourth year after the takeover is compute as
lnTFPt+4   lnTFPt 1.
21Table A1 in the Appendix reports the eects of domestic M&A on target rm TFP as a consistency check.
Accordingly, the TFP eects of domestic M&A follow a dierent pattern over time than those for foreign M&A.
Still, the corresponding coecients are not statistically signicant at conventional levels.
17Table 3: Balancing test from kernel estimation
Mean % bias t-test Mean % bias t-test
target control target control
foreign M&A: domestic M&A:
lntfp-op .6970 .7088 -2.2 -0.28 .6802 .7090 -5.5 -0.84
return-cap 31.40 29.47 2.4 0.30 31.87 29.33 3.6 0.56
debt-asset .0179 .0168 5.4 0.68 .0163 .0169 -3.1 -0.47
size 1.22 .5500 13.0 1.65 .6700 .5800 2.4 0.37
size2 34.00 21.00 2.0 0.25 10.00 12.00 -2.1 -0.32
age 27.68 29.18 -6.5 -0.82 26.27 29.09 -12.8 -1.97
state .1447 .0971 14.6 1.84 .0764 .0970 -7.3 -1.12
quoted .0629 .0323 14.4 1.82 .0191 .0312 -7.7 -1.19
exit .0189 .0270 -5.4 -0.68 .0297 .0277 1.2 0.19
US M&A: EU M&A:
lntfp-op .7376 .7286 1.5 0.11 .6746 .7233 -8.9 -0.80
return-cap 29.05 30.17 -1.7 -0.12 36.81 30.15 7.7 0.69
debt-asset .0161 .0169 -3.9 -0.29 .0186 .0165 10.4 0.93
size 1.37 .4735 14.8 1.10 1.19 .5590 14.7 1.32
size2 62.13 13.44 8.9 0.66 18.78 19.97 .2 0.02
age 24.21 28.50 -20.2 -1.50 28.76 28.81 -0.2 -0.02
state .1607 .0964 19.3 1.44 .2112 .1024 30.2 2.71
quoted .1161 .0302 33.3 2.49 .0932 .0338 24.5 2.19
exit .0179 .0265 -5.9 -0.44 .0186 .0261 -5.1 -0.45
18Table 3 continued
Mean % bias t-test Mean % bias t-test
target control target control
manufacturing M&A: services M&A:
lntfp-op .5454 .5331 3.2 0.26 .7927 .8056 -2.1 -0.19
return-cap 26.55 21.54 6.9 0.55 33.45 32.43 1.1 0.10
debt-asset .0236 .0166 33.6 2.69 .0145 .0175 -16.4 -1.49
size .9500 .7100 5.0 0.39 1.34 .4856 15.6 1.43
size2 17.00 31.00 -1.9 -0.15 45.58 15.49 5.6 0.51
age 31.50 35.10 -13.1 -1.04 24.33 26.49 -10.8 -0.98
state .0787 .0885 -3.5 -0.28 .1807 .1042 22.0 2.00
quoted .0158 .0421 -15.8 -1.25 .0904 .0291 26.0 2.37
exit .0158 .0248 -6.4 -0.51 0.0241 .0272 -1.9 -0.18
foreign M&A: foreign M&A:
Y=L 17.32 71.47 -12.0 -1.50
lntfp-Ca -1.12 -.1382 -6.3 -0.79
return-cap 13.39 25.74 -12.0 -1.70 31.30 29.43 2.3 0.29
debt-asset .0194 .0176 7.5 1.06 .0179 .0168 5.7 0.72
size 1.10 .6852 7.7 1.10 1.23 .5524 13.1 1.65
size2 27.68 31.32 -.5 -0.07 33.67 21.23 2.0 0.25
age 27.72 28.85 -4.8 -0.68 27.64 29.19 -6.7 -0.84
state .15 .1195 8.9 1.26 .1456 .0972 14.8 1.86
quoted .07 .0410 12.7 1.79 .0633 .0323 14.5 1.82
exit .0325 .0296 1.7 0.24 .0190 .0270 -5.3 -0.67
Balancing tests based on propensity score matching for year 0.
19Table 4: The cumulative eect of foreign M&A on TFP
year TFP-di deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0511 (-2.00) 318/124688 .219
1 .0130 (0.49) 239/102582 .198
2 .0402 (1.03) 176/84647 .178
3 .0315 (0.84) 133/68581 .160
4 .0203 (0.49) 92/54050 .186
5 -.0566 (-1.03) 72/40034 .103
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
LR-test of joint insignicance of all regressors after matching.
Table 5: The cumulative eect of US versus EU M&A on TFP
US M&A EU M&A
year TFP-di deals/obs LR-test TFP-di deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0234 (-0.42) 112/103431 .373 -.0207 (-0.68) 161/104684 .123
1 .0558 (1.16) 83/84873 .237 -.0083 (-0.21) 126/85758 .240
2 .1478 (1.66) 56/69859 .378 .0159 (0.39) 96/70524 .215
3 .0212 (0.35) 45/56464 .808 .0551 (0.92) 67/56993 .126
4 .0360 (0.42) 31/44373 .612 -.0187 (-0.35) 45/44789 .373
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
20on the home country of the foreign acquirer. For example, Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002)
uncover positive M&A eects only in the case of US multinationals. In Table 5, we distinguish
between two dierent regions of origin of the foreign acquirer: the US and the EU+. The
evolution of the TFP performance of target rms of US multinationals is comparable to the
overall eect of foreign takeovers in the rst four post M&A periods: the coecient is negative
in the year of completion, positive thereafter, peaks in the second year after the M&A, and
levels o afterwards.22 However, the positive growth dierence in the second year after the
M&A is 3.5 times higher (it amounts to 14.8%) and statistically signicant at the 10% level for
US takeovers. Thus, we nd some evidence in favor of positive TFP eects from foreign M&A
if the acquiring rm is based in the US. In contrast, we do not observe signicant impacts of
M&A from EU+ countries.
Table 6 distinguishes between the eects from foreign takeovers in manufacturing and ser-
vice industries. The evolution of TFP for target rms in the manufacturing sector is again
comparable to the overall eect of foreign takeovers in the rst four post M&A periods: the
coecient, which amounts to 7.8%, is negative and signicant at a 5% level in the year of the
takeover and positive but not signicant at conventional levels thereafter. In contrast, we are
not able to detect a similar pattern in the service sector. The corresponding coecients are
very small and not signicant.
Finally, Table 7 outlines the results for two alternative TFP measures which are based
on an OLS production function estimation and the multilateral TFP index (lntfp   Caves)
developed by Caves et al. (1982), respectively. The latter TFP indicator has been used in
the literature, e.g., by Bertrand and Zitouna (2008).23 Table 7 shows that we do not nd a
signicant aggregate impact of foreign takeovers on target rm productivity in post-acquisition
periods based on these two alternative TFP measures. This is consistent with the results based
on Olley-Pakes TFP levels.24
22The pattern of TFP eects due to US (or foreign) takeovers can be described by an 'S-curve'.
23Note that, in contrast to our preferred TFP measure based on Olley and Pakes (1998), it implicitly assumes
perfect competition in factor markets and constant returns to scale in order to compute input elasticities.
24We also convert the logged TFP levels based on Olley-Pakes into a TFP index relative to industry averages.
The results, which are reported in Table A5 in the Appendix, do not dier qualitatively from the ndings in
21Table 6: The cumulative eect of foreign M&A on TFP in manufacturing versus services
M&A in manufacturing M&A in services
year TFP-di deals/obs LR-test TFP-di deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0779 (-2.39) 127/35677 .164 -.0374 (-0.90) 166/74656 .173
1 .0159 (0.41) 95/29894 .744 .0270 (0.68) 126/60775 .191
2 .0283 (0.53) 71/25127 .506 .0702 (1.19) 95/49622 .286
3 .0899 (1.32) 57/20691 .492 -.0096 (-.21) 67/39804 .321
4 .0602 (.99) 40/16589 .544 -.0002 (-0.00) 46/31071 .256
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table 7: The cumulative eect of foreign M&A on alternative TFP measures
Caves et al. OLS
year TFP-Ca-di deals/obs LR-test TFP-OLS-di deals/obs LR-test
0 -.1782 (-1.13) 316/124251 .001 -.0523 (-2.07) 318/124688 .164
1 -.1302 (-0.87) 239/102188 .004 .0122 (.47) 239/102582 .145
2 -.1558 (-1.08) 176/84320 .010 .0408 (1.08) 176/84471 .165
3 -.1071 (-0.61) 133/68319 .022 .0283 (.78) 133/68581 .176
4 -.1062 (-0.49) 91/53832 .066 .0141 (.34) 92/54050 .214
5 -.4134 (-1.18) 72/40873 .074 -.0614 (-1.07) 72/41034 .101
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
22In sum, we do not nd solid evidence in favor of a longer-run TFP gain in the post-acquisition
period caused by foreign acquisition at the aggregate level.
5.2 Industry specic eects
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) highlight the importance of industry specic eects of the relationship
between rm productivity and cross-border M&A. To explore this, we analyze the impact of
foreign M&A separately for 34 dierent two-digit industries. Table 8 shows the results for the
six industries where we identify a positive causal impact of foreign M&A on UK target rm TFP
levels in post-acquisition periods. First, we detect a negative signicant initial drop in TFP that
is followed by insignicant eects thereafter relative to domestic rms in the food, beverages
& tobacco industries. Second, we nd pronounced positive TFP eects due to foreign M&A in
three manufacturing industries: manufacture of electrical equipment & machinery, manufacture
of communication equipment & apparatus, and printing & publishing. Foreign-acquired rms
outperform their domestic counterparts by 20-100% in the second to the fourth year after the
takeover in the rst two manufacturing industries and two years after the M&A in printing and
publishing. Third, we observe the opposite impacts in two dierent service industries. On the
one hand, foreign-acquired rms experience lower TFP-growth than domestic counterparts in all
post M&A periods in renting of machinery & equipment. On the other hand, they have higher
TFP-growth until the second post-takeover year in computer and related activities. Thus, we
nd positive evidence in favor of technological or organizational spillovers from foreign acquirers
to domestic target rms in the electronic manufacturing and service industries. In other words,
the potential for positive productivity eects appears to be largest in UK electronic industries.25
Overall, the industry level results highlight a signicant heterogeneity in the eect of foreign
acquisitions on target rm productivity across industries which is consistent with the Nocke and
Yeaple (2007) theoretical predictions. This heterogeneity across industries potentially explains
our baseline specication.
25This nding diers from Girma and G org (2002) who use, however, a dierent data set, methodology, and
a dierent measure of TFP.
23the absence of positive longer-run TFP eects at the aggregate level.26
Moreover, the theoretical model of Nocke and Yeaple (2007) implies that the scope for pro-
ductivity spillovers from the acquiring to the target rm is most pronounced if the acquirer
operates in an R&D-intensive industry while productivity spillovers might even be negative if
it operates in a marketing-intensive industry. A direct test of this hypothesis requires, however,
information on the R&D and marketing expenses of the acquiring rms, respectively. This
information is not available in the Amadeus data set. However, we can draw on the work
of Peneder (2002) who uses cluster analysis to classify US manufacturing industries as R&D
and marketing-intensive at the four-digit level.27 We follow his classication to test for pos-
itive or negative productivity eects in the two dierent sub-groups, respectively.28 Table 9
reveals positive TFP coecients in all post-acquisition periods if the acquirer operates in an
R&D-intensive industry indicating that foreign ownership enhances the TFP levels of foreign-
acquired rms in these industries.29 The eect is, however, only signicant on a 10% level
in the fourth year after the acquisition. In contrast, we nd negative TFP coecients in all
26Moreover, (horizontal) foreign M&A may lead to a concentration in market power involving a decline in
competition which potentially entails lower long-run productivity growth in that industry. This eect would
counteract the positive productivity eects and might hence also explain the absence of positive longer-run TFP
eects at the aggregate level.
27Peneder (2002) classies the following manufacturing industries as R&D-intensive: pesticides and other
agro-chemical products, pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, botanical, and other chemical products, oce
machinery and computers, electricity distribution and control apparatus, electronic components, television and
radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony, television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or
reproducing apparatus, medical, precision and optical instruments, motor vehicles, aircraft and spacecraft. Fur-
thermore, he classies the following as marketing-intensive: food products, beverages and tobacco, leather and
leather products, publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media, soap and detergents, cleaning and
polishing preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations, tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal; manufac-
ture of central heating radiators and boilers, cutlery, tools and general hardware, watches and clocks, musical
instruments, sports goods, games and toys, miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c.
28We assume that R&D and marketing intensities are comparable across countries at the industry level.
29We also classify target rms in high or low technology industries, respectively, following the OECD classi-
cations (see for example OECD, 2007, p. 220-221). However, we do not nd signicant eects of foreign M&A
in these particular sub-groups. The results are available from the authors upon request.
24Table 8: The cumulative eect of foreign M&A on TFP by two-digit NACE codes
year TFP-di deals/obs LR-test TFP-di deals/obs LR-test
Food, beverages & tobacco: Publishing & printing:
0 -.1695 (-2.13) 16/4197 .734 .1153 (1.17) 10/3937 .613
1 -.0704 (-0.82) 11/3558 .888 .0141 (0.22) 8/3294 .504
2 -.0473 (-0.36) 10/3006 .770 .2988 (1.84) 6/2762 .650
3 -.0783 (-0.77) 8/2491 .781 .3201 (0.66) 3/2251 .608
4 -.1042 (-0.60) 5/2012 .817 .2503 (1.23) 2/1798 .726
Manuf. of oce & electrical mach.: Manuf. of communication equ.:
0 -.0818 (0.96) 9/2501 .377 -.3213 (-1.65) 3/766 .688
1 .1979 (3.27) 5/2081 .813 .1494 (0.26) 3/635 .785
2 .1431 (2.08) 5/1754 .811 1.03 (2.97) 3/523 .491
3 .1818 (2.77) 3/1447 .643 1.45 (2.93) 3/434 .501
4 .2795 (3.95) 3/1160 .657
Renting of mach. & equ.: Computer services & related act.:
0 -.2324 (-1.92) 4/1177 .826 -.0323 (-0.50) 22/3880 .921
1 -.1640 (-2.08) 3/974 .688 -.1236 (-1.03) 13/3088 .674
2 -.1616 (2.38) 3/807 .678 .1990 (2.55) 7/2485 .905
3 -.0775 (-4.47) 3/650 .706 -.0341 (-0.31) 5/1972 .957
4 -.0711 (-2.82) 2/512 .705 .1177 (1.31) 3/1505 .437
The industry codes are NACE15-16, NACE22, NACE30-31, NACE32,
NACE71, NACE72, NACE72, respectively.
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
25post-acquisition periods if the acquirer operates in a marketing-intensive industry indicating
that foreign ownership leads to a decline in the TFP levels of foreign-acquired rms in these
industries. Again, the eect is only signicant at a 10% level in the second year after a foreign
takeover. In sum, a classication of acquiring rms as R&D and marketing-intensive results in
a systematic pattern of post-acquisition TFP eects that is consistent with the specic TFP
ranking of acquiring rms in Nocke and Yeaple (2007).
5.3 Labor productivity
The ndings in Section 5.1 call into question the evidence of longer-run TFP eects of foreign
ownership on foreign-acquired rms in the UK at the aggregate level and highlight instead a
substantial heterogeneity in the eects across industries. These ndings are consistent with
Harris and Robinson (2003) who do not nd aggregate TFP eects due to foreign M&A in
the UK. However, they conict with the ndings of Conyon et al. (2002) who detect that US
subsidiaries in the UK outperform domestic rms in terms of labor productivity. Therefore,
we address the following question: does the impact of foreign M&A depend on the measure of
rm productivity?
Table 10 reports the results for the dierence-in-dierence matching estimator for the ef-
fects of foreign acquisition on rm labor productivity. Indeed, we nd that the use of labor
productivity as a performance measure results in signicant productivity increases due to for-
eign takeovers in all of the rst ve post-acquisition periods.30 This is consistent with the labor
productivity based ndings of Conyon et al. (2002). The last four columns of Table 10 repeat
the aggregate TFP results form Table 4 to contrast the dierence between the two productivity
measures. Moreover, Table 11 distinguishes between labor productivity eects in the manufac-
turing and service sector and reveals that the increase in labor productivity is predominantly
30Note that the likelihood ratio test rejects the balancing conditions in the second and third year after the
takeover. Thus, the matching procedure does not allow for a meaningful comparison between foreign-acquired
rms and the counterfactual of domestic rms for these periods. However, Table 11 shows that the increase
in labor productivity is mainly due to an increase in the manufacturing sector and the balancing condition is
satised in this sector in all post-acquisition periods.
26Table 9: The cumulative eect of foreign M&A on TFP if acquirer R&D or marketing-intensive
Acquirer R&D-intensive Acquirer marketing-intensive
year TFP-di deals/obs LR-test TFP-di deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0726 (-1.03) 29/19172 .759 -.1193 (-2.19) 13/7893 .444
1 .0525 (0.63) 20/15704 .686 -.1456 (-1.59) 8/6406 .785
2 .0217 (0.18) 16/12873 .695 -.2222 (-1.79) 7/5172 .820
3 .2407 (1.34) 14/10306 .638 -.1373 (-1.03) 6/4027 .849
4 .1684 (1.66) 11/7834 .843 -.2253 (-1.19) 4/2974 .839
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table 10: The cumulative eect of foreign M&A on labor productivity versus TFP
labor productivity TFP
year Y=L-di deals/obs LR-test TFP-di deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0192 (-0.83) 400/118675 .047 -.0511 (-2.00) 318/124688 .219
1 .1064 (3.97) 319/98379 .245 .0130 (0.49) 239/102582 .198
2 .0700 (2.01) 247/81177 .021 .0402 (1.03) 176/84647 .178
3 .1115 (2.88) 189/65710 .002 .0315 (0.84) 133/68581 .160
4 .1446 (2.70) 146/51648 .094 .0203 (0.49) 92/54050 .186
5 .2242 (3.55) 105/38860 .149 -.0566 (-1.03) 72/40034 .103
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
27driven by manufacturing industries. It follows that foreign-acquired rms outperform matched
domestic rms in the manufacturing sector in terms of labor productivity but not TFP in
post-acquisition periods.31
Against this background, it is important to recall the dierence between the two measures.
TFP reects target rm eciency gains due to the diusion of technological or organizational
knowledge and economies of scale. Therefore, it is a precise empirical counterpart to the theo-
retical literature on multinational rms which exactly emphasizes these transmission channels.
Labor productivity, in contrast, is a broader measure that captures these TFP eects as well
as changes in the target rm's capital-labor ratio. For example, one can derive the following
log-linear relationship between labor productivity, TFP and the capital-labor ratio in the case
of a Cobb-Douglas production function: ln(Y=L) = ln(TFP) + ln(K=L). Hence, we support
that the increase in labor productivity due to foreign ownership stems from an increase in the
capital-labor ratio, i.e., capital deepening, instead of technological or organizational knowledge
diusion. Table 12 conrms this conjecture, revealing that foreign M&A leads to capital deep-
ening in UK target manufacturing rms in post-acquisition periods. The order of magnitude
of the increases in the capital-labor ratios is in line with the increases in labor productivity.
Thus, foreign rms substantially restructure acquired rms in the UK reducing the number of
employees relative to capital stocks.32 This nding reconciles the dierence between the results
based on TFP and labor productivity.
It follows that the use of labor productivity instead of TFP to measure the impact of
foreign acquisition on improvements in technological or organizational knowledge in the UK
acquired rms is misleading. Instead, the increase in foreign acquired rm's labor productivity
in post-acquisition periods is caused by capital deepening and not the theoretically suggested
TFP eects. This conrms that TFP is the more appropriate measure to identify the causal
impact of foreign acquisitions on rm performance as described in the theoretical literature on
31Table A1 in the Appendix reports the eects of domestic M&A on labor productivity. It does not indicate
any positive eect of domestic M&A on labor productivity in post-acquisition periods, in contrast to the eects
of foreign M&A.
32In fact, we nd that the number of employees in foreign-acquired rms declines signicantly in the manu-
facturing sector in post-acquisition periods. These results are available from the authors upon request.
28Table 11: The cumulative eect of foreign M&A on labor productivity in manufacturing vs
services
manufacturing services
year Y=L-di deals/obs LR-test Y=L-di deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0558 (-1.84) 161/33852 .040 .0025 (.07) 215/72423 .043
1 .1125 (3.03) 126/28684 .231 .1050 (2.60) 174/59364 .233
2 .1308 (2.86) 103/24144 .456 .0001 (0.00) 131/48457 .112
3 .0974 (2.56) 83/19927 .443 .0672 (0.99) 95/38779 .042
4 .1074 (2.05) 64/15946 .642 .1121 (1.23) 76/30136 .216
5 .2323 (2.55) 45/12224 .684 .1490 (1.68) 55/22393 .485
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table 12: The cumulative eect of foreign M&A on capital-labor ratio in manufacturing vs
services
manufacturing services
year K=L-di deals/obs LR-test K=L-di deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0001 (-.00) 160/34518 .000 .0204 (.39) 207/73316 .018
1 .1289 (2.83) 126/29492 .057 .0018 (.02) 171/60829 .093
2 .2000 (3.43) 104/25076 .219 -.0443 (-.41) 130/50193 .125
3 .1580 (2.11) 84/20878 .237 -.0853 (-.79) 94/40550 .044
4 .1517 (1.59) 64/16896 .573 -.1428 (-.87) 75/31714 .159
5 .0534 (.43) 44/13059 .639 -.2674 (-1.68) 55/23776 .448
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
29multinational rms.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the causal relationship between foreign acquisitions and target rm pro-
ductivity using a rich micro data set from the UK over the period 1999-2007. We use propensity
score matching combined with a dierence-in-dierence estimator which allows us to distinguish
between causality and correlation eects of foreign ownership.
Our results call into question the existence of longer-run eects of foreign ownership on
TFP at the aggregate level. A supplementary analysis which distinguishes between dierent
countries of origin of foreign acquirers does not challenge this main conclusion.
However, we nd that the eects of foreign acquisitions vary across industries. It appears
that foreign ownership led to higher productivity in ICT manufacturing industries but not
in ICT service industries. These industry level results highlight a signicant heterogeneity
in the eect of foreign M&A on target rm productivity across industries which is consistent
with the theoretical predictions of Nocke and Yeaple (2007). This heterogeneity across indus-
tries potentially explains the absence of positive longer-run TFP eects at the aggregate level.
Moreover, when we follow the theoretical suggestions of Nocke and Yeaple (2007) by classifying
acquiring rms as R&D and marketing-intensive, we broadly reveal a systematic pattern of
post-acquisition TFP eects that is consistent with their theoretical predictions which generate
a specic TFP ranking of acquiring rms.
Finally, we nd positive aggregate eects on labor productivity but not TFP in the man-
ufacturing sector, i.e., foreign M&A leads to capital deepening but not improvements in tech-
nological or organizational knowledge in the longer-run. Hence, the use of labor productivity
instead of TFP generates misleading results with respect to the causal impact of foreign M&A
on target rm performance in the UK as described in the theoretical literature on multinational
rms.
30A Appendix
A.1 Estimation of production functions under simultaneity
Using equation (2) we decompose the error term "jt into two elements, i.e., "jt = !jt + jt,
where !jt is the productivity shock and jt is the true error term. Further, ajt measures a the
age of a rm. Hence, we can write
Yjt = 0 + 
kkjt + 
lljt + !jt + jt (3)
The simultaneity problem arises if !jt is correlated with at least one of the regressors. In
such a case, estimates ^ k and ^ l would be biased. In the recent literature on the estimation
of production functions, one generally assumes that the demand for labor is the only input
which is potentially correlated with !jt as capital stocks are assumed to be predetermined. As
a remedy, Olley and Pakes (1996) propose a two-stage procedure for a consistent estimation of
(3) in which they advocate the use of a rm's log investment ijt to identify the productivity
shock. In doing so, they dene the investment function  such that ijt = t(!jt;kjt;ajt). If
investments are monotonically increasing in the technology shock for a given value of capital
and age, this allows them to express the unobservable technology variable as a function of
contemporaneous investments, capital, and age. Hence, they dene the inverse investment
function by mt so that !jt = mt(ijt;kjt). Thus, one can rewrite (3) as
Yjt = 0 + 
kkjt + 
lljt + mt(ijt;kjt) + jt: (4)
Further, we dene
t(ijt;kjt) := 0 + 
kkjt + mt(ijt;kjt)
and approximate this term by a third order polynomial series in k and i.33 Consequently, we
33In particular, we dene









lljt + t(ijt;kjt) + jt (5)
Since we control for contemporaneous movements in productivity by the inverse investment
function, OLS estimation of (5) yields consistent estimates of l.
The second stage is necessary to identify k. Therefore, we assume that productivity follows
a rst order Markov chain, i.e, !jt = E(!jtj!
j
t 1) + jt, where jt denotes the innovation in the
productivity and is assumed to be uncorrelated with capital in period t. Dening vt as output












vjt = 0 + 
kkjt + g() + jt + jt (6)
Note that we restrict capital and lagged capital to have the same coecient. Consequently,
as the coecient enters the regression equation twice we estimate it eciently and consistently
by applying to (6) a non-linear least squares procedure.
A.2 Additional robustness checks
Table A1 reports the eects of domestic M&A on target rm TFP and labor productivity.
Accordingly, the TFP eects of domestic M&A follow a dierent pattern over time than those
for the foreign M&A. However, they are not statistically signicant at conventional levels (apart
from a positive TFP eect in the fth year after a domestic takeover which is signicant at
the 10 % level). Moreover, we do not detect a positive eect of domestic M&A on labor
productivity in post-acquisition periods (apart from the third year after a domestic takeover
which is signicant at the 10 % level). Hence, in contrast to foreign M&A, domestic M&A do
not lead to capital deepening in the target rm in post-acquisition periods.
34Note that we do not correct for sample attrition since we do not observe the exit of rms.
32Table A1: The cumulative eect of domestic M&A
TFP labor productivity
year TFP-di deals/obs LR-test Y=L-di deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0327 (-1.51) 471/131753 .183 -.0309 (-1.29) 547/123418 .011
1 -.0115 (-0.42) 321/108106 .135 .0068 (0.25) 428/102346 .004
2 -.0312 (-0.77) 212/89236 .307 .0507 (1.52) 311/84419 .033
3 .0124 (0.32) 155/72489 .221 .0707 (1.64) 246/68329 .073
4 .0347 (0.81) 115/56958 .458 .0588 (1.33) 179/53696 .134
5 .0468 (1.93) 82/43246 .870 .0494 (.98) 134/40377 .627
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table A2 reveals that we do not nd signicant dierences between the eects of vertical
and horizontal M&A.
Tables A3 shows the descriptive statistics for foreign-acquired rms that can not be ac-
counted for in the second stage of the dierence-in-dierence matching estimation. Table A4
lists the total number of deals in the population and our eective sample across two-digit NACE
industries. Finally, Table A5 reports the results for a TFP index relative to industry averages
and the weighted TFP estimations based on Olley and Pakes (1996), respectively.
33Table A2: The cumulative eect of foreign vertical vs horizontal M&A on TFP
horizontal M&A vertical M&A
year TFP-di deals/obs LR-test TFP-di deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0703 (-1.59) 80/99986 .146 -.0453 (-1.48) 238/111931 .381
1 .0216 (0.49) 52/82136 .143 .0089 (0.28) 187/91880 .586
2 .0338 (0.54) 33/67717 .140 .0394 (0.86) 143/75697 .686
3 .0950 (.79) 21/54755 .173 .0169 (0.44) 112/61297 .451
4 .0750 (1.49) 18/43090 .326 .0028 (0.06) 74/48301 .433
5 .1601 (2.41) 15/32631 .136 -.1180 (-1.81) 57/36654 .334
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table A3: Descriptive statistics including all foreign M&A
Target rms All other rms Missing foreign M&A
rms mean sd rms mean sd rms mean sd
lntfp-op 318 0.7 0.52 14330 0.71 0.6 288 0.68 0.62
Y=L 400 256.81 931.71 12884 552.88 2375.1 560 516.84 1380.57
lntfp-Caves 316 -1.12 2.54 14330 -0.19 31.01 282 -0.05 4.19
lntfp-ols 318 0.76 0.53 14330 0.8 0.6 288 0.79 0.63
return-cap 318 31.4 93.33 14330 28.69 70.89 275 2.46 135.83
debt-asset 318 0.02 0.02 14330 0.02 0.02 340 0.03 0.15
size 318 1.22 5.66 14330 5.79 4.86 642 2.86 1.33
age 318 27.68 24.72 14330 28.74 21.78 1953 18.80 18.77
state 318 0.14 0.35 14330 0.09 0.29 1953 0.11 0.31
quoted 318 0.06 0.24 14330 0.03 0.17 1953 0.05 0.22
exit 318 0.02 0.14 14330 0.03 0.17 1953 0.14 0.35
34Table A4: Number of foreign M&A by industry
M&A M&A % M&A % M&A
industry NACE total sample total sample % di
mining and quarrying 10 51 5 2.25 1.57 -0.67
food, beverages, tobacco 15-16 65 16 2.86 5.03 2.17
textile products 17 13 3 0.57 0.94 0.37
wearing apparel, leather 18-19 11 2 0.48 0.63 0.14
wood products 20 6 0 0.26 0.00 -0.26
paper products 21 14 1 0.62 0.31 -0.30
publishing, printing 22 58 10 2.55 3.14 0.59
chemical products 23-24 81 18 3.57 5.66 2.09
rubber, plastic products 25 38 11 1.67 3.46 1.79
non-metallic mineral products 26 28 4 1.23 1.26 0.02
basic metals 27 12 2 0.53 0.63 0.10
fabricated metal products 28 72 16 3.17 5.03 1.86
machinery and equipment 29 60 12 2.64 3.77 1.13
oce, electrical machinery 30-31 50 9 2.20 2.83 0.63
communication equipment 32 28 3 1.23 0.94 -0.29
optical instruments 33 42 4 1.85 1.26 -0.59
motor vehicles, trailers 34 15 2 0.66 0.63 -0.03
other transport equipment 35 15 2 0.66 0.63 -0.03
furniture and recycling 36-37 72 12 3.17 3.77 0.60
electricity, gas, water supply 40-41 27 0 1.19 0.00 -1.19
construction 45 68 20 2.99 6.29 3.30
sale, repair of motor vehicles 50 15 5 0.66 1.57 0.91
wholesale, commission trade 51 185 35 8.15 11.01 2.86
retail trade 52 55 13 2.42 4.09 1.67
land transport 60 13 2 0.57 0.63 0.06
water and air transport 61-62 24 8 1.06 2.52 1.46
auxiliary transport activities 63 38 5 1.67 1.57 -0.10
post and telecommunications 64 45 6 1.98 1.89 -0.09
nancial intermediation 65 80 6 3.52 1.89 -1.64
auxiliary nancial intermediation 67 34 3 1.50 0.94 -0.55
real estate activities 70 46 6 2.03 1.89 -0.14
renting machinery, equipment 71 13 4 0.57 1.26 0.69
computer and related activities 72 306 22 13.47 6.92 -6.56
R&D and other business 73-74 591 51 26.02 16.04 -9.99
Sum 2271 318 100 100 0
35Table A5: The cumulative eect of foreign M&A on TFP as an index or weighted
foreign M&A Hausman
year TFP-OP-index deals/obs LR-test TFP-OP-weighted deals/obs LR-test test (H)
0 -.1008 (-1.13) 318/124688 .204 -.3032 (-1.34) 318/124843 .201 1.12
1 -.0592 (-1.48) 239/102582 .226 .1079 (.48) 239/101876 .158 0.18
2 .3725 (0.89) 176/84647 .181 .4120 (1.40) 175/84071 .153 1.63
3 .0093 (0.11) 133/68581 .212 .2595 (.87) 131/68109 .162 0.59
4 -.0727 (-1.21) 92/54050 .214 .2393 (.84) 90/53676 .194 0.60
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%. The Hausman test indicates that the results
from the weighted estimation and the unweighted in Table 4 are not signicant at conventional levels.
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